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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2335 
____________ 
 
TED AARON MCCRACKEN; MCCRACKEN  
FUEL COMPANY INCORPORATED  
      
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK NA, sued in its official and 
individual capacities; WACHOVIA BANK, sued in its 
individual and official capacities; JOHN DOE I, 
President, Wachovia Bank NA, sued in his individual 
and official capacities; JOHN ROE I, Supervisor, 
Wachovia Bank NA, Patriot Act Compliance Team, sued 
in his individual and official capacities; JOHN POE, 
Technical Analyst, Wachovia Bank NA, sued in 
his individual and official capacities; JOHN ZOE I, 
Patriot Act Compliance Officer, Wachovia Bank NA, 
sued in his individual and official capacities; JOHN 
NOE I, Technical Computer Operator, Wachovia 
Bank NA, sued in his individual and official capacities; 
WELLS FARGO BANK NA, sued in its official 
and individual capacities; JOHN DOE, President, 
Wells Fargo Bank NA, sued in his individual and 
official capacities; JOHN ROE, Supervisor, Wells 
Fargo Bank NA, Patriot Act Compliance Team, 
 sued in his individual and official capacities; JOHN 
POE I, Technical Analyst, Wells Fargo Bank NA, 
sued in his individual and official capacities; JOHN 
ZOE, Patriot Act Compliance Officer, Wells Fargo 
Bank NA, sued in his individual and official capacities; 
JOHN NOE, Technical Computer Operator, Wells Fargo 
Bank NA, sued in his individual and official capacities 
 
    Ted Aaron McCracken,  
       Appellant 
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 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-01915) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis       
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 14, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Ted Aaron McCracken appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 McCracken sued Wells Fargo Bank on April 9, 2015 in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, purporting to assert constitutional claims 
either pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985 and § 1981, or Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  He also asserted 
various state law claims.  McCracken’s claims related to his inability to access his bank 
account using his debit card while in Douala, Cameroon in 2011, and his subsequent 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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arrest, conviction, and imprisonment in Pennsylvania for theft.  McCracken sought 
money damages.1   
 In 2010, McCracken opened a checking account with Wachovia Bank, which was 
subsequently purchased by Wells Fargo, and, on March 25, 2011, he purchased an 
airplane ticket to Cameroon, with a stop in Paris, France, on his Wachovia/Wells Fargo 
debit card.  While in France, McCracken was able to access his bank account but when he 
arrived in Cameroon on April 10, 2011 and tried to use his debit card to withdraw money 
from an ATM, his transaction was denied.  It was then denied another five times over the 
next few days.  When he and his wife, who is of African descent, had exhausted the cash 
they had, he gained access to his mother’s bank account and transferred some of her 
money into his own account.  The next day, April 17, 2011, he was able to access his 
account from Cameroon using his debit card.  Unfortunately, his mother reported the 
theft to police, and McCracken was arrested when he returned to the United States.  In 
2012, McCracken was convicted in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas and 
sentenced to 2½-5 years of imprisonment for the theft of $1,400 from his mother’s bank 
account, see Docket No. CP-46-CR-0004322-2011.  McCracken raised justification and 
duress defenses at trial, unsuccessfully.  He also sought to subpoena records from 
                                              
1 An entity by the name of McCracken Fuel Company, Inc. was also named as a plaintiff 
in the caption of the complaint.  On the ground that a corporation may only appear in 
federal court through licensed counsel, the District Court dismissed McCracken Fuel 
Company, Inc., without prejudice, citing Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II 
Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993).  We note that McCracken signed 
the notice of appeal only on behalf of himself and thus appealed to this Court only on 
behalf of himself. 
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Wachovia/Wells Fargo, but the bank allegedly did not respond to the subpoena or 
produce those records.   
 In the main, McCracken alleged in his complaint that Wells Fargo discriminated 
against him because of his wife’s race,2 but he also alleged that Wells Fargo had abused 
its authority under the Patriot Act by retaliating against him for lawsuits he had filed in 
the past against the federal government. 
 In an order entered on April 24, 2015, the District Court granted McCracken leave 
to appeal in forma pauperis, but dismissed his complaint prior to service.  The District 
Court determined that McCracken’s claims lacked a basis in law or fact, could not 
proceed because of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), or were barred by the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations. 
 McCracken appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In his brief on 
appeal, McCracken specifically argues that the District Court erred in denying his breach 
of contract claim as time-barred because that cause of action has a four-year statute of 
limitations. 
 We will affirm.  Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, such as where the plaintiff is unable to 
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more 
                                              
2 In July, 2012, McCracken learned from watching the news that Wells Fargo had 
reached a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice related to allegations that it had 
engaged in a pattern of racially discriminatory banking practices against blacks and 
Hispanics during the mortgage boom.  Based on that settlement, he surmised that his 
inability to access his bank account reflected the bank’s racial animus. 
5 
 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress constitutional 
violations caused by officials acting under color of state law, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982), while Bivens authorizes a cause of action to redress 
constitutional violations caused by officials acting under color of federal law, 403 U.S. at 
396-97.  Section 1985 provides a cause of action for a conspiracy to violate federal rights.  
See Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 We agree with the District Court that nothing in McCracken’s complaint plausibly 
shows that Wells Fargo was acting under color of state or federal law in rejecting his 
debit card transactions.  That Wells Fargo settled claims based on discriminatory conduct 
from 2004 to 2009 during the mortgage boom/crisis has no relevance to his inability to 
access his bank account in 2011.  In addition, McCracken’s theory that Wells Fargo 
prohibited him from accessing his account for six days to retaliate against him for filing 
numerous lawsuits against the federal government is speculative and thus also 
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
679-81. 
 To the extent that success on McCracken’s claims would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction or imprisonment, such as his claims that he was driven to 
commit theft and that Wells Fargo failed to answer a subpoena for records, those claims 
are not cognizable in a federal civil action because he failed to show that his conviction 
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, see 
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Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.  A claim for damages based on a conviction that remains valid 
may not be pursued in federal court, id.  
 To the extent that McCracken raised claims that are not barred by Heck, such as 
tort claims based on his inability to access his account and on his arrest, his claims are 
time-barred.  McCracken filed suit on April 9, 2015.  A two-year statute of limitations 
governs his federal civil rights claims and his state law tort claims.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 5524; Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989); Napier 
v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1087 (3d Cir. 1988).  
McCracken’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrued on or about June 9, 
2011, when his preliminary arraignment took place, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 
397 (2007) (§ 1983 claim seeking damages for false arrest begins to run at time plaintiff 
becomes detained pursuant to legal process), and any claims based on his inability to 
access his account accrued by April 16, 2011, the end of the six-day period during which 
time he could not access his bank account in Africa.  
 McCracken correctly notes that a state law breach of contract claim is governed by 
a four-year statute of limitation, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525(a), and that his complaint 
was filed within four years of April 16, 2011.  Moreover, contrary to Wells Fargo’s 
assertion, see Appellee’s Brief, at 10, we do not understand the District Court to have 
determined, in the alternative, that McCracken failed to state a plausible, non-frivolous 
state law general breach of contract claim.  On the contrary, the District Court’s 
implausibility focus was on McCracken’s claims that Wells Fargo had caused him to 
commit an act of theft, discriminated against him because his wife is of African dissent, 
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and retaliated against him because he previously had sued the federal government for 
causing his thyroid cancer.  The District Court did not decide that a state law general 
breach of contract claim for improper rejection of his debit card withdrawals was 
implausible or legally without merit.3  Nevertheless, a District Court may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where it has dismissed all 
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  Here, dismissal of 
any state law general breach of contract claim without prejudice, pursuant to the District 
Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, would have been 
entirely proper and thus we will uphold the District Court’s determination on that basis.4  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
McCracken’s complaint 
                                              
3  The complaint may not clearly state a contract claim that is separate from McCracken’s 
implausible theories.  However, we note that in Count II of the complaint, McCracken 
alleged a “breach of fiduciary contract” by Wells Fargo for denying him access to his 
bank account. 
 
4 Section 1367(d) provides for tolling of the limitation periods where appropriate.  28 
U.S.C. § 1367(d). 
